The two faces of Mohammed bin Zayed

You can hardly look away these days: UAE, 'the little Sparta of the Gulf', are hip and they are especially visible. In travel brochures, Dubai guarantees sun-drenched holidays on golden sandy beaches. The number of Sunday amateur riders wearing UAE Team Emirates cycling jerseys is growing on the Flemish towpaths. Increasingly, the stone-rich Emirates manage to buy with petrodollars what cannot actually be bought: a glitzy image, prestige and goodwill in the West.

In Oxford, Sorbonne and Harvard universities, the seven emirates have a foot in the door through expensively paid research projects and chairs. They open embassies around the world and are major donors in the international aid industry. This often involves staggering sums that other countries can only dream of. Moreover, the Emirates do not shy away from operating in circumstances that Western companies find too risky.

Over the past decade, the UAE has become the fourth-largest investor in Africa, after China, the European Union and the United States. They are pumping money into ports, mines and energy projects. Dubai state-owned DP World, meanwhile, manages ports in nine African countries and recently won a new concession in Tanzania. In this way, the UAE is increasingly putting itself on the map as an important link between Africa and Asia, an ambition it is playing out further with airline Emirates.

Not only are they making themselves noticed beyond the country's borders, they are also opening their own doors wide. Dubai hosts major international events like last year's climate summit, and is currently considered the logistics hub for the international humanitarian sector, which has settled there en masse. The Emirates' investment climate is known to be excellent, helped along by free trade zones where foreign financiers can own companies without restriction. And this despite, or perhaps rather thanks in part to, the other list they are on: the Grey List of countries where money laundering operations are a breeze.

In short, the UAE has become a brand name. This has not escaped Brand Finance, the international company that annually releases the soft power index of 193 countries, determining which nations have the greatest influence in terms of culture, entrepreneurship and diplomacy. UAE dwarfs giants like the United States, China and India in terms of land area and population, but for the second time in a row, the Gulf state ranks number 10 in this global ranking.

In their own region, they even rank number one in the soft power index, smoothly ahead of other regional powerhouses Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. Their formula for success? A sustained and strategic deployment of their petrodollars on a diversified economy that remains strong and stable even today, in a turbulent world.

'The most important Arab leader'

But branding and marketing are not everything, the UAE believes. Besides soft power, they are therefore also betting firmly on their foreign policy. And what one. Over the past decade, they made themselves noticed with remarkably aggressive meddling beyond their own borders. Using mercenaries, their own soldiers, or logistical support to militias and armies, the UAE interfered in conflicts in the Middle East and in Africa (see box).

In the Emirates' muscular foreign policy, the hand of one man in particular stands out: the UAE president, Mohammed bin Zayed, better known as 'MBZ'. 'The most important Arab leader' is how author and journalist Carolien Roelants calls MBZ in her book World in Disorder (2021). According to Roelants, his guiding principle is that attack is the best defence, both with weapons and within diplomacy.

Harry Verhoeven, professor at Columbia University in New York and a specialist in the region, also subscribes to this. Speaking to MO*, Verhoeven explains how MBZ drew a line under the previously unifying policies of his father, Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan.

The first president of the United Arab Emirates was more of a tribal leader who united people at home and far beyond, seeking consensus. That paternalism of his father served other times, Verhoeven said. MBZ no longer has that luxury. 'In today's world, a world of flared global and regional rivalries, MBZ says you have to strike hard and sometimes make cynical, bold and clear choices.'

MBZ, like his father, always felt that the Emirates was in the shadow of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan therefore felt it was appropriate to manoeuvre very cautiously in regional politics. But his son sees it differently. The weaknesses of Iran and Saudi Arabia have created an opportunity in recent decades, Verhoeven explains: 'With oil, gas and other sources of revenue such as logistics and in the financial sector, MBZ is trying to give the UAE a clout they never had historically. This translates into controversial initiatives both domestically and internationally. Think, for example, of the Abraham accords with Israel or support for unsavoury regimes and armed groups.'

His tactic of hitting hard while plentifully building his own image is not always appreciated by MBZ. 'In the various Emirates, there are a lot of people who disapprove of his approach, but they are no longer in power,' says Verhoeven. 'But even in the West, they know that MBZ causes problems. Only: in the most important issues, such as defence or energy, in their eyes he still makes the right choices that serve Western interests. That is why they forgive him the rest.'

With its aggressive foreign policy, MBZ risks overplaying its hand in its own region, Verhoeven observes. With the Emirates so explicitly taking on big brother Saudi Arabia, they believe the Gulf state should be put back in its place. 'Two years ago, the Saudis ordered all foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia to move their regional headquarters to Riyadh or to Jeddah. That undisguised protectionism has hit the UAE. There is a belief among Saudi Arabia that the Emirates will return to its normal place. But that is not guaranteed.'

What stability?

In the West, the UAE made itself noticed with aggressive shadow practices. Just last year, it came to light how, at their behest, a Swiss company specialising in 'dark PR' launched large-scale smear campaigns against European Muslims. These were allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood's political-Islamic movement.

The smear campaign - which, incidentally, often targeted people unjustly - illustrates the importance MBZ attaches to this movement: he is scared to death of it. 'The Muslim Brotherhood is a revolutionary Islamic organisation that challenges the state from below,' Roelants told MO*. 'That is highly dangerous in the eyes of an autocrat like MBZ. He should have nothing to do with revolutionary popular movements of any kind.'

In his essay Gulf States and Sharp power: allies to adversaries (2024), US Gulf expert Christopher Davidson refers to the rifts between the US and its former allies in the Gulf. The UAE in particular plays a notable role, directing, through hacking practices and troll farms, hostile campaigns against US democratic institutions and media.

What is striking, writes Davidson, is how the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are increasingly openly drifting away from democratisation. Autocracies are, in the eyes of the Gulf states, the best option for stability in the turbulent Middle East, from which the US has withdrawn.

Small player, big ambitions

With their immeasurably deep pockets and shrewd geopolitics, the UAE seems to be omnipresent. But how big is their power really? They may pale in comparison to the United States or China, but we should not underestimate their influence, according to Verhoeven. 'In places where those two superpowers themselves do not want to intervene more directly, the Emirates are indeed very influential. This is partly because there is a kind of unity of command: if the emir has a certain line in mind, it is followed and implemented by the whole system. So they can manoeuvre in a fairly quick and convenient way. Especially in places like Eritrea, Sudan or Chad, where you can do relatively a lot with relatively little money.'

One difference with the other Gulf states, Verhoeven believes, is that the Emirates are also taken seriously as a military force. 'Most Gulf states are paper tigers that buy a lot of expensive weapons without having much military clout to show for it. For the Emirates, it is somewhat different. They do have a real military that has participated in missions around the world since the late 1990s. These militaries are also respected, for example by Western advisers who are themselves in that army.'

MBZ has money and can therefore do a lot of damage, says Carolien Roelants. She points to the 'extremely unpleasant role MBZ takes on in Sudan and Libya in particular.' Yet she also recalls power of numbers. 'Above all, let us not forget how small the Gulf state is, both in area and population.'

MBZ may have a very big mouth, but he has to be mindful of his angry neighbour: Iran. That over neighbour is not only unpredictable but also has a population of 88 million. MBZ is well aware of this. 'Despite the Abrahamic accords with Israel, the UAE is careful not to hit Iran just short of the head,' says Roelants. 'A tactic on which, as a small player, they build their overall diplomatic vision.'

_{Translation of this article is provided by kompreno, using a combination of machine translation and human correction. More articles from MO* are included in kompreno‘s curation of the finest analysis, opinion & reporting — from all across Europe, translated into your language.}