India claims a central position in the new world order

I mean: yes, a new world order is coming, but it will not be built on the strength of population numbers but on principles and values. And so the question is: what values does India want to stand up for?

C. Raja Mohan: It is an old observation that the world has changed, and it has been part of the rhetoric in Delhi for decades. India must have a greater voice in the global power debate, and hence in the UN Security Council. India is not giving up on its demand for a reformed United Nations, but knows that it must seek other platforms to actually realise its ambition for greater influence.

Then we are talking about the Quad (Australia, Japan, the US and India), the G7+3 (by 2021: + India, Australia and South Korea), the Mineral Security Partnership or the Artemis Accords for space exploration. Minilateral cooperation is the new marching direction.

Foreign Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said in 2022 that we live in an extremely polarised world and therefore India is indeed more likely to opt for minilateralism: small coalitions of countries with shared interests.

Sushant Singh: The limits of India’s ‘realistic’ position and presence in various international platforms becomes clear when choices have to be made. What other country has sided with both Russia and Israel? In my view, India’s foreign policy is driven only by short-term interests, not long-term vision or principled positions. This lack of firmness of principle is also visible in the region, where the current government supports both the junta in Myanmar and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Did previous Indian governments have a long-term vision for their geopolitical strategy?

Sushant Singh: Of course, India’s foreign policy is always meant to serve its own interests — this is true of all countries in the world. But it used to be done from a clear value framework, which is absent now. You can see this within India too. In Manipur, hundreds of churches were burnt down in ethnic violence that has been dragging on for a year now. In Kashmir, the Muslim majority is silenced and opposition leaders are put behind bars….

Democracy and freedom of expression are under increasing pressure. India ranks 161 on Reporters sans Frontières’ media freedom index, lower than Afghanistan: there is a reason for that.

Is India striving for an international order based on clearly agreed rules?

Sushant Singh: In relation to China, India likes to invoke an international rule of law, but in relation to countries like Pakistan, Nepal or Sri Lanka, it forgets about those rules. International rules are not a principle for India, but an excuse.

Can India become a leader and spokesperson for the Global South?

Sushant Singh: For India to become the voice of the Global South is very difficult. China is already taking that leadership role and has the resources to do so. India does not have the ability to challenge the West economically, technologically or militarily. Therefore, I do not see India’s rise as an alternative to Western power.

On the contrary, today India is seen internationally mainly as a useful ally of the West, to limit China’s power. In the 1950s and 1960s, India was a leading nation for the Global South. But then it also stood for clear values. India actually supported anti-colonial movements then, while today it prefers to cooperate with the former colonisers.

C. Raja Mohan: How can India both lead a decolonial struggle and be an ally of the West at the same time? India does not make it an anti-colonial struggle but simply points out the importance of the problems of the non-Western world. It is not just about Ukraine, that is the message.

I don’t know why you in the West are so focused on who represents the Global South. Either it is because you are still struggling with guilt for the crimes committed in the colonies, or because you fear the barbarians are at the gate, ready to take over the beautiful garden of European civilisation — to borrow the words of Josep Borrell.

Anti-colonial sentiments are still sometimes brought out by India and China to gain allies and influence in the Global South, but really, we need to move away from that. We are past that stage.

As a matter of fact, Indian students are studying in the West; Indian trade is largely with the West; and India’s upper middle class starts spending their hard-earned pennies on tourism in the West. Britain has a prime minister and the US has a vice-president of Indian origin. We live in this world, not that of 75 years ago.

And in this world, is India the vishwaguru or teacher of the world that it promises to be?

C. Raja Mohan: India never presented itself in those terms, the Hindu nationalist mass movement RSS did. But even they stopped doing so. It was a political discourse that started getting a bit out of hand. Prime Minister Modi now talks about India as vishwamitra: not the teacher of the world, but the friend of everyone in the world.

The Indian government is outspokenly pro-Israel. Does that cause problems?

Sushant Singh: The Global South has largely opposed the Israeli war, while India remains on Netanyahu’s side. That is damaging, yes.

C. Raja Mohan: India takes a three-pronged approach to the Gaza conflict: unequivocal condemnation of Hamas terror, a call for Israel to respect the law of war, and support for a Palestinian state. This is in line with moderate Arab countries that have themselves bet on cooperation with Israel, including the Abraham Accords. The Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) has not severed diplomatic relations with Israel and Iran has not terminated cooperation with India.

India and China are neighbours but live at odds, at a time when Asia could play a dominant role on the international stage.

Sushant Singh: China usually sees India as a henchman of the United States. As a result, it distrusts its large neighbour. The foreign ministry in Beijing, meanwhile, has 10 times more people in its Japan department than in India’s. The ministry spends three-quarters of its time on its relationship with the United States. That is the difference: China weighs heavily in India’s geopolitics and even internal politics, but conversely, India hardly plays a role in China’s geopolitical calculations.

C. Raja Mohan: To say India has a problem with China is an understatement. There have been 50,000 soldiers on standby at the border in the northern region of Ladakh for four winters now. India also wants to do something about its own trade deficit with China, which now rises to $100 billion a year. Yet the government keeps repeating that it seeks good relations with China and that the ball is in China’s court.

China, by the way, is not only challenging India. There are the disputes with the Philippines over some sandbanks in Philippine waters. Ditto with Japan. China is as expansionist in Asia as Russia is in Europe. India seeks a multipolar Asia in which it can co-exist peacefully with China and Japan. By not accepting that, China is pushing its neighbours into the arms of the United States.

India’s position in its own South Asian region is also anything but acquired. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been virtually stagnant for a decade.

C. Raja Mohan: That is not India’s fault. In 2014, there was a ministerial agreement to better connect the region, but at the last minute, the Pakistani army forced the government to backtrack on that. In early 2016, India suffered a series of terrorist attacks. This prompted the boycott of the summit scheduled to take place in Pakistan in late 2016. The other members of SAARC also cancelled their attendance thereafter.

Sushant Singh: I don’t think Modi is against SAARC, but he wants to exclude Pakistan from cooperation. That explains the de facto blocking of the body. As an alternative, India was betting on alliances with other South and Southeast Asian countries without having to tolerate Pakistan at the table.

C. Raja Mohan: It is similar to a two-speed Europe: where progress is possible, you realise it with whoever wants to come along. Where it is impossible, you just wait. India is a big country, the promise of trade is attractive enough for countries like Bangladesh, Nepal or Sri Lanka to seek cooperation with India in other ways.

So with Pakistan and Afghanistan in the west, cooperation does not seem to work, which is why India has put more effort into sub-regional cooperation with eastern neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. And on trans-regional cooperation under BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, with Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar).

The emphasis of India’s regional policy used to be on Eurasia. Is there now more focus on the Indian Ocean and its maritime connections with Southeast Asia, East Africa and the Middle East?

C. Raja Mohan: Starting with the economic reforms in 1991, steps were taken towards Southeast Asia. Improving relations with the Middle East are more recent, with the IMEC trade corridor between India, the Middle East and Europe being the most notable initiative. Attention to Africa’s markets and natural resources came later. This means that the original Look East policy has since evolved into a much broader policy that includes all regions and adds new collaborations.

Sushant Singh: A country becomes a superpower only after it became one in its own region. If your immediate neighbours don’t like or trust you, how can you be respected as a superpower in the rest of the world? In early April, the ASEAN Studies Centre published a survey showing that India ranks very low among policy or opinion makers in Southeast Asia.

They rate India’s influence as low as Canada’s, even lower than the EU. They also expect nothing from India and do not believe it is a force for good or committed to free trade. All very sobering for those who believe the Indian media and government.

Then there is the wider Indo-Pacific cooperation. What is it about?

Sushant Singh: Power in the Indian Ocean is primarily a matter of trade, but the Modi government is not a true supporter of free trade. Therefore, India does not fully opt for its central position in the Indian Ocean as the place to realise its power. Besides, it does not have the military resources to focus its power there. The Indian military’s main focus is on ground forces stationed on its borders with Pakistan and China.

India is not interested in free trade, you say, yet a major trade corridor between India and Europe, via the Middle East, was announced at the G20 summit in September 2023. Doesn’t that contradict your thesis?

Sushant Singh: The IMEC (India, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel) was an infrastructure project rather than a trade project, and it was more of an announcement than a concrete plan. Anyway, India should prioritise trade with ASEAN, which is a logical and historical partner for India. And it is a global trade hub.

But India refuses to join the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Viet Nam). And it still refuses to sign the trade pillar of the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, with Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam & USA).

One cannot help but notice that India under Modi is against free trade. Therefore, India also cancelled a number of older free trade agreements.

I participated in a seminar on the IMEC in Delhi on 6 October. Professor Raja Mohan argued then that India’s ties with the Middle East were historically important, and that the Gulf Arab countries were far more important today than the Palestinian issue. The next morning, Hamas invaded Israel. Does that change your assessment at the time?

C. Raja Mohan: The Gaza tragedy will not last forever and in the meantime, the underlying reasons for India, the Middle East and Europe to make better connections remain equally relevant. I saw a report a few days ago that India and the UAE would start drawing up the protocols for working out IMEC.

By the way, any discussion on the future of Gaza centres on the Gulf countries: what position will they take? Will they supply troops? How much will they contribute for reconstruction? Will they help the Palestinian Authority take back control of Gaza?

The Gulf’s financial clout has not changed, so cooperation remains important. Saudi Arabia will play a central role in this. Will the kingdom recognise Israel, and under what conditions — particularly in relation to the Palestinian cause?

Within India, meanwhile, the power of Hindu nationalism is growing. Does this affect the country’s international position?

Sushant Singh: Hindu nationalists have a three-step plan: first to secure power in India, then to transform the country from a secular country to a Hindu nation, and finally to restore an undivided South Asia under a Hindu majority. This is an unattractive prospect for Muslim neighbours like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

But even outside South Asia, concerns are growing about India’s direction. Twenty years ago, everyone in the US was convinced that an alliance with India was a foregone conclusion because two great democracies could together present a front against China. Today, that certainty has turned to doubt. The question in Washington now is: which India are we actually friends with?

This does not mean that India will soon be isolated. In international relations, countries are not averse to faulty regimes. Everyone has relations with Saudi Arabia, for instance. Or with Iran. But the image of and support for India will suffer.

C. Raja Mohan: India’s emergence as a world power is entirely linked to its growing economic significance. That is what really matters. The idea that Hindu nationalist forces are taking over India altogether is a misleading and superficial reading of the complex reality in India, a profoundly diverse country.

When the prime minister inaugurates an extremely politicised temple, surely there is more to it than a diverse country that is poorly understood from the outside?

C. Raja Mohan: Throughout North India, as a result of the invasion [of Muslim armies and rulers in the Middle Ages], temples were destroyed. It is not surprising then that there is a party that wants to restore the temples. The question is: can this be done in a peaceful agreement with the Muslims? The dispute over the temple in Ayodhya was 150 years old and was settled in court.

So its inauguration says nothing about a power grab by Hindu nationalists. In the West, people should make an effort to see the real discussions and evolutions in India, instead of always coming off with overly simple cries like ‘drifting towards dictatorship’ or ‘Hindu nationalism threatens all diversity’.

In any case: Europe will continue to trade with India. If you did business with China for 50 years, India has nothing to fear.

Is the world heading for a clash between democratic countries and authoritarian regimes, with India as the largest democracy leading that first camp?

Sushant Singh: You are more likely to find India in that other camp soon, I fear.

In 2019, Modi used an attack on the army and then his attack on Pakistani territory to mobilise his supporters. In 2024, he seems to see no need for that?

Sushant Singh: Modi is not invincible and his support is less than often thought. His party secured 37 per cent of the vote in 2019. That is less than Indira Gandhi in 1971 or Rajiv Gandhi in 1984. Also, the majority in the Lok Sabha is 303 out of 545 seats, which is less than Congress used to have.

Not all Indians support Modi: not those of the South, not in the East, not dalits or adivasis, not Muslims and not Christians…. Modi’s real power base are the upper caste Hindus, those who fill the media, the think tanks, the academic positions, the opinion pages. Modi is adored by his supporters, but he is equally passionately hated by those who do not vote for him.

When Modi feels insecure, he often addresses that by boosting the threat from Pakistan and challenging it. He already did this when he was state prime minister of Gujarat. The reason is twofold. Demonising Pakistan mobilises and unites Indians under one banner AND it also immediately projects Islam and Muslims as the true enemy. This almost always works to renew and increase the following of Hindu nationalism.

He would therefore benefit from a new Pakistan incident, but the continuing tension on the Chinese border is keeping the army so busy that it is unable to engage in an active confrontation along the Pakistani border. Having to move a few army divisions from Kashmir to Ladakh, India appealed to the UAE in 2020 to negotiate a ceasefire with Pakistan.

The current government wants to make India a developed economy by 2047. That seems an almost impossible task.

C. Raja Mohan: Politics is a matter of ambition and clear goals, and Prime Minister Modi has both. Congress and the opposition should support that ambition, and then try to make it clear that they would do better. But rejecting the pursuit of economic growth and returning to the narrative of redistribution and state initiative, rather than growth and modernisation, is disappointing.

European history shows that there are different stages in the growth of national economies: growth and industrialisation, then redistribution, and so on. Each European country has found its own way through these options and stages. This is politically debated between liberals and social democrats, between conservatives and progressives. How do you build a modern economy? How do you reduce inequality? We need that debate in India too.

This article is compiled from two separate interviews in mid-April and was originally published in Dutch.